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NOTE
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: THE NEW STANDARD
OF RETROACTIVITY
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has severely curtailed the
availability of federal habeas corpus relief for state capital de-
fendants by limiting their ability to benefit from intervening
changes in constitutional law. Although the Constitution neither
prohibits nor requires the retroactive application of new consti-
tutional principles,1 the Court has recognized a "nonretroactiv-
ity" defense to claims for relief that are based on new rules of
law.2 The Court's recent retroactivity decisions reveal that the
defense has become a major obstacle to federal habeas corpus
relief for state petitioners, and for state capital petitioners the
obstacle could cost them their lives.
The defense of "nonretroactivity" has been recognized for
more than twenty-five years.3 This defense has been reinforced
of late by a new broad standard of retroactivity. State capital
petitioners will not be able to benefit from "new"' rules of law
unless the rule falls into one of two very narrow exceptions., The
new doctrine was first established in Teague v. Lane, and Penry
' Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) ("[The Constitution neither pro-
hibits nor requires retrospective effect.").
2 See JArEs S. LmBiAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 85-90
(Supp. 1989).
1 See notes 33-38 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the progeny of
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the first decision to recognize the defense of
"nonretroactivity."
See notes 73, 96-99, 107-17 & 123-27 and accompanying text infra for the Court's
recent definitions as to what constitutes a "new" rule.
' See notes 74-78, 100-01, 118-20 & 128-31 and accompanying text infra for the
Court's definition and application of the exceptions.
6 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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v. Lynaugh7 and has been broadly defined so that its impact on
state capital petitioners has been especially harsh. Capital peti-
tioners are denied the benefit of newly announced constitutional
rules-rules that could save their lives. This impact is apparent
in the cases of Butler v. McKellar,s Saffle v. Parks,9 and Sawyer
v. Smith;10 in each the Court applied and further modified the
new retroactivity doctrine.
This Note examines how the new standard of retroactivity
has affected the ability of a state capital petitioner to benefit
from the federal writ of habeas corpus. Part I of this Note ex-
plores the writ's history and competing interpretations of its
purpose. Part II discusses the old standard of retroactivity and
the development and application of the new standard. Part III
analyzes the impact of the new standard on capital petitioners
and addresses some of the problems with the Court's retroactiv-
ity analysis. Part IV offers a recommendation for legislative ac-
tion to counteract the effects of the Court's recent decisions in
this area. This Note concludes that some form of legislative ac-
tion is absolutely essential in order for state capital petitioners
to obtain federal habeas corpus relief whenever new rules of con-
stitutional law render their convictions or sentences illegal.
I. THE FEDERAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
A. History of the Writ
The writ of habeas corpus-the "Great Writ"-has its ori-
gins in English common law and has been considered to be "the
most celebrated writ in the English law."" Its importance is
based on its value as a remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement. 2 In the United States, the Framers embraced the
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
a 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
10 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
" 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-
400 (1963) (discussing origins of the writ).
12 Fay, 372 U.S. at 400. There are different forms of the writ of habeas corpus. This
Note is concerned with habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the function of which is the
"inquiry into illegal detention with a view to an order releasing the petitioner." Id. at 399
n.5. The other forms have functions that are not relevant to this Note; for a discussion of
them, see BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at **129-32.
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common law notions of habeas corpus in the Constitution1 3 as
well as in the Judiciary Act of 1789.14 The Judiciary Act of 1789,
however, was not designed for state petitioners-it authorized
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in fed-
eral custody. The specific availability of federal habeas corpus
for state petitioners was not addressed until 1867.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 empowered the federal
courts to issue writs of habeas corpus "in all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."'" Al-
though the words of the statute appear to be unambiguous, the
legislative history reveals little as to the legislative intent behind
its enactment."' Thus, there have been various interpretations as
to the proper scope of the writ.
From 1867 until the 1930s, federal habeas relief for state pe-
titioners was generally limited to cases in which the state statute
defining the offense or the punishment was unconstitutional or
the conviction or sentence was void for lack of jurisdiction. 17 Al-
though it was established that federal habeas corpus relief could
be granted when a state petitioner had been denied a federally
protected constitutional right, from the 1930s until the 1950s va-
rious procedural obstacles to relief made the consideration of
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.").
14 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-1631 (1982)). Section 14 of the
Judiciary Act provides, in part:
[E]ither of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district
courts, shall have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of
an inquiry into the cause of commitment.
Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
15 C- 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867) (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
2255 (1982)). Section 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). See generally WILLIAM F. DUKe, A CONSTITUTIONAL HisioRY
OF HARsAs CoRpus, 189-94 (1980).
" See DUKER, supra note 15, for an overview of the congressional history of The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.
" See generally DONALD E. WnLKEs, Ja. FEDRAL AND STATE PosTcoNvz cnON Rn2w-
DIES AND RELIEF 23-24 (1983) (discussing Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of
the writ).
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habeas petitions on the merits rare.18 A more expansive imple-
mentation of the writ was not practiced until the 1960s.19
The Warren Court enlarged the number of federal rights
available for state defendants, removed various procedural ob-
stacles to habeas relief, and expanded the scope of review of the
federal courts.20 This expansion of the writ lasted until the early
1970s, when the Burger Court began to restrict the availability
of federal habeas corpus relief. The Burger Court narrowed the
scope of federally protected rights and generally expanded the
number and reach of various obstacles to relief.2 The Rehnquist
Court has continued this trend of establishing procedural barri-
ers to the federal habeas corpus remedy, as is apparent in the
Court's recent retroactivity decisions.2 2 These differing interpre-
,8 See id. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (state petitioners who were one
day late in appealing their stale conviction were barred from federal habeas review of
their cases because they failed to demonstrate that the delay resulted from "lack of
counsel, incapacity, or some interference by officials").
" See generally WILKES, supra note 17, at 23-24.
20 Id. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (state prisoner's failure to appeal from a
conviction was not an intelligent and understanding waiver of his right to appeal so as to
justify the witholding of federal habeas corpus relief); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963) (evidentiary hearing required in federal habeas corpus proceeding challenging the
validity of a state conviction). Fay effectively overruled Brown. See note 22 infra.
2' See generally WILKES, supra note 17, at 23-24. Cf. Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982) (state prisoners who failed to make timely objection under state rule to the cor-
rectness of jury instructions could not litigate their claim in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding without a showing of cause for and actual prejudice from the failure to ob-
ject); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (state prisoner who failed to make timely
objection under state rule to the admission of inculpatory statements could not litigate
that claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding without showing cause for and actual
prejudice from the noncompliance); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (state
prisoner who failed to make timely challenge under state rule to the composition of the
grand jury that indicted him could not litigate that claim in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding without showing of cause for and actual prejudice from the failure to chal-
lenge). Taken together these cases effectively overruled Fay. See note 22 infra.
22 See notes 139-58 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the impact of
the new standard of retroactivity. See also Timothy J. Foley, The New Arbitrariness:
Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 151, 193, 195 (1989) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's continuation of the Burger
Court's legacy of constructing barriers to the assertion of claims presented in federal
habeas actions); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991,
993-96 (1985) (explaining the existence of federal habeas corpus review in spite of the
lack of enthusiasm of the Court for the writ in general).
In its 1991 term the Rehnquist Court erected yet another procedural barrier to the
federal habeas corpus remedy. In Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), the
Court denied a state capital petitioner federal habeas corpus review of his case because
the petitioner's lawyer had filed the state habeas corpus petition three days late. 111 S.
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tations of the scope and availability of the writ spring from dif-
ferent conceptions of the purpose of the writ.
B. The Purpose of the Writ: Competing Interpretations
The determination of the purpose of the federal writ of
habeas corpus directly affects the availability of the writ for
state petitioners. If the primary purpose of the writ is to ensure
that the individual is free from restraints contrary to fundamen-
tal law, then the scope of the writ will be interpreted broadly.2 3
On the other hand, if the primary purpose is to ensure that the
state courts abide by federal constitutional standards, the scope
of the writ will be interpreted more narrowly.24 These competing
values of individual liberty and federalism have shaped the
habeas corpus debate.
The habeas debate can be framed as a cost-benefit analysis:
the costs to state sovereignty and state resources versus the ben-
efit of protecting individual rights by providing the individual
with a federal forum. 25 The debate has intensified because fed-
eral habeas corpus is the only means by which federal judges can
hear constitutional challenges to state convictions and
Ct. at 2552-53. The Court determined that this constituted "procedural default" and
that federal habeas corpus review of the petitioner's claim was barred because the peti-
tioner was unable to demonstrate cause for and actual prejudice from the late filing. See
id. at 2565. The Court has thus resuscitated Brown v. Allen, 344 US. 443 (1953), and has
officially departed from the theory espoused in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See 111
S. Ct. at 2561-66. See also notes 18 & 20 supra.
Although the 6-3 opinion in Coleman was written by Justice O'Connor, with Justices
Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens dissenting, it is interesting to note that subsequently
Justice O'Connor, along with Justice Stevens, joined a statement by Justice Blackmun
written in response to a refusal by the Court to hear an appeal strikingly similar to that
in Coleman. The statement urged the federal courts to consider carefully substantial
federal claims and afford a meaningful federal habeas review where necesmry. See O'Dell
v. Thompson, 112 S. Ct. 618 (1991) See also Linda Greenhouse, In Shift, O'Connor
Urges Appeal in Murder Case, N.Y. Tesms, Dec. 3, 1991, at B1O.
The Warren Court's expansion of the writ was based on its view that "Habeas lies
to enforce the right of personal liberty, when that right is denied and a person confined,
the federal court has the power to release him." Fay, 372 U.S. at 430-31.
24 The Burger Court's restriction of habeas corpus was based on the fact that it VWs
"not as concerned as the Warren Court was with the possibility that governmental power
may be abused, or individual rights violated .... The Burger Court [was] preoccupied
with assuring... that amicable federal-state relations [were] not disturbed ....
WiKEs, supra note 17, at 24.
25 See notes 132-38 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the Court's bal-
ancing, or lack thereof, of these competing concerns in its new retroactivity analysis.
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sentences;2" without this federal forum state prisoners are lim-
ited to appealing their convictions directly within their own
state court systems. 27 The divergent opinions on the habeas de-
bate result from the differing views as to the proper balance be-
tween the needs of the state and those of the individual.
Critics of a broad interpretation of habeas corpus claim that
the "finality" of state judgments is undermined by both the de-
lay involved and the fact that federal review threatens to over-
turn a conviction which has been affirmed by the state's highest
court.28 According to this view, federal-state comity is of ex-
treme importance; although it is important to deter state courts
from unconstitutional decision making through the threat of
federal habeas review, federal intrusion must be limited. These
2" Not only is this the only way for judges in the federal district courts and courts of
appeals to hear such challenges, but in addition, the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion with regard to granting habeas corpus review is rather limited:
[Tihe jurisdiction conferred on [the Supreme Court] to issue writs of habeas
corpus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. . . . is discretionary and [the] Court
does not, save in exceptional circumstances, exercise it in cases where an ade-
quate remedy may be had in a lower federal court, or, if the relief sought is
from the judgment of a state court, where the petitioner has not exhausted his
remedies in the state courts.
Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219 (1943) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Generally, all
state remedies must be exhausted before federal habeas corpus relief can be granted.
Section 2254 contains the following exhaustion requirement:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it ap-
pears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective pro-
cess or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to pro-
tect the rights of the prisoner.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). According to § 2254, "An applicant shall not be deemed to
have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State, to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). The exhaustion requirement
relates to the time the application for § 2254 relief is filed: the convicted person must
have satisfied the exhaustion requirement by the time of filing. See WILKES, supra note
17, at 147. See also note 38 infra for a discussion of state and federal remedies.
21 Of course a state petitioner may ultimately appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, but this does not ensure that the Court will hear the challenge. See 28 U.S.C. §
1257 (defines the limited circumstances in which the Court will grant a review on writ of
certiorari). And, as this Note will demonstrate, the ability to appeal to the Supreme
Court is meaningless for the state prisoner who bases her challenge on a new rule of
constitutional law that did not exist at the time her conviction became final. See notes
68-131 and accompanying text infra.
2' See generally Yackle, supra note 22, at 1010-19 (discussing the criticisms of fed-
eral habeas corpus for state petitioners).
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critics argue that the deterrence function can be accomplished
by requiring that states comply with only those constitutional
standards which are unambiguous at the time the defendant's
conviction became final.29 Thus, the state's reliance on prevail-
ing law will be protected, while at the same time, state courts
will be given an incentive to fulfill the primary purpose of
habeas corpus: to ensure that state courts observe constitutional
standards.
Habeas defenders assert that the protection of individual
rights requires federal review, and therefore federal courts must
have the final say on federal issues.30 According to this view,
states must abide by constitutional standards, even if those
standards are unclear at the time of conviction. Thus, decisions
must be overturned if the Supreme Court's ultimate decision on
the issue differs from that of the state.31 The defenders believe
that this view of the deterrence function adequately fulfills the
primary purpose of habeas corpus: to protect the state defend-
ant from unconstitutional convictions.32
The habeas debate is an ongoing one; because the scope of
federal habeas corpus relief is shaped by the differing views on
the purpose of the writ, the debate will inevitably continue. The
debate is particularly intense in the retroactivity context. Be-
cause the retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional
law to a state petitioner's case on federal habeas corpus review
may be the key to a reversal of the state conviction, habeas crit-
ics and defenders naturally hold strong views on when new rules
of law should be retroactively applied.
29 Cf. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2830 (1990) ("Federal habeas corpus serves
to ensure that state convictions comport with the federal law that was established at the
time the petitioner's conviction became final"); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe threat of habeas serves as a necezsary ad-
ditional incentive for [state] courts... [to abide by] constitutional standards; this "de-
terrent function" is served by applying standards which prevailed at the time of the
original proceedings.").
-0 See generally Yackle, supra note 22 (discussing the defenses to the criticisms of
federal habeas corpus for state petitioners).
31 See L BuBN, supra note 2, at 104-05 ("[Ihe only meaningful way to give [states]
an incentive to treat ambiguous questions of federal constitutional law responsibly.., is
to require state-level decisions to be remade whenever thay deviate from the decision the
Supreme Court ultimately renders on the question.).
See id. at 105.
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II. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE STANDARD OF RETROACTIVITY
A. The Old Standard: Linkletter and its Progeny
To understand the new standard of retroactivity announced
by the Rehnquist Court in the 1989 and 1990 terms, it is neces-
sary to understand the evolution of the old standard. The Court
recognized the defense of "nonretroactivity" in 1965, in Linklet-
ter v. Walker.3 In Linkletter the issue was whether the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio -4 should apply
to state convictions that had become final before Mapp was de-
cided.3 5 The Court applied a three-factor balancing approach in
determining whether to retroactively apply the exclusionary
rule. The three factors were: (1) the purpose to be served by the
new standard; (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement au-
thorities on the old standard; and (3) the effect on the adminis-
tration of justice of a retroactive application of the new stan-
dard.3 6 The Linkletter Court balanced the factors and decided
that the Mapp rule did not require retroactive application.37
The Court would thereafter apply the Linkletter approach on a
case-by-case basis. Shortly after Linkletter, the Court held that
this analysis applied both to convictions that were final and to
convictions pending on direct review.3 8
" 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
34 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (state courts were required to exclude evidence seized in vio-
lation of the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment).
" The Court explained that "final" meant that the judgment of conviction had been
rendered, the availability of appeal had been exhausted, and the time for petition of
certiorari had elapsed. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5.
" Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. Whereas
Linkletter first applied a three-factor balancing approach, Stovall consolidated the anal-
ysis into a "three-prong test" but did not alter its substantive terms.
"' Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637-38. The Court decided that the purpose of the Mapp
rule would not be advanced by making the rule retroactive, that the states had relied
upon the old standard, and that to make the rule retroactive would "tax the administra-
tion of justice to the utmost." Id. The Court therefore held that "[a]fter full considera-
tion of all the factors we are not able to say that the Mapp rule requires retrospective
application." Id. at 640.
11 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966). A conviction is pending on di-
rect review when "trial remedies" or "appellate remedies" have not yet been exhausted.
See WILKES, supra note 17, at 3-4. These remedies can include state remedies, federal
remedies, or both. Id. A conviction is final when the ordinary methods of direct review
have been exhausted, or the allowable time to exercise these methods has passed. See
note 35 supra for the Linkletter Court's definition of "final." A final conviction can be
challenged by resorting to a "postconviction remedy," also called a "collateral remedy."
See WILKS, supra note 17, at 3-4. A case is on collateral review when it is before a court
[Vol. 57:865
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Although the Court would employ the Linkletter approach
for twenty-two years,39 a conflict existed within the Court on the
applicability of the .approach to cases on direct and collateral
review. 40 Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist v. United States41
and concurrence in Mackey v. United States42 were evidence of
his frustration with the Linkletter approach and its failure to
treat differently the retroactive application of rules for cases on
direct and collateral review. Justice Harlan argued that in decid-
ing whether to apply a rule retroactively, the determining factor
should be the procedural stance of the case and not the purpose
of the new rule in question.4 3 According to Justice Harlan,
"'Retroactivity' must be rethought.""14 Justice Harlan's argu-
ments for change in the area of retroactivity were to be adopted,
although gradually, by the majority of the Court in the years to
follow.
Justice Harlan advocated treating differently cases on direct
and collateral review. According to Justice Harlan, courts should
resolve all cases on direct review in accordance with existing
governing constitutional principles.4 And, as a general rule,
in order to consider a previous, and otherwise final, judgment. Postconviction remedies
can be state or federal. This Note is concerned with the collateral remedy of federal
habeas corpus. See also note 26 supra for a discussion of the federal habeas corpus re-
quirement of exhaustion-which generally includes the exhaustion of state direct and
postconviction remedies before the federal writ can be granted.
I" See notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra.
40 See note 38 supra for a definition of direct and collateral review.
411 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969). The majority, employing the Linkletter approach,
refused to give retroactive application to a "new" rule regarding the reach of the Fourth
Amendment to a case on direct review. Justices Douglas and Fortas also dissented, each
writing separately. In his dissent, Justice Harlan introduced his theory concerning the
retroactive treatment of new constitutional rules to cases on direct and collateral review.
See notes 45-58 and accompanying text infra.
42 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971). The majority, employing the Linkletter approach,
held that a "new" rule regarding the Fifth Amendment did not apply retroactively to a
case on collateral review. Justices Brenn4n and Marshall concurred in the judgment, and
Justices Douglas and Black dissented. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment only,
and wrote a separate opinion to further explain and modify the theory that he first intro-
duced in his Desist dissent, concerning the retroactive application of new constitutional
rules to cases on direct and collateral review. See notes 45-58 and accompanying text
infra.
"I See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 682 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe relevant frame of
reference, in other words, is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the petitioner
seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.").
, Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4 See Mackey, 401 U.S at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist, 394 U.S. at 259
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courts should resolve all cases on collateral review in accordance
with the law prevailing at the time the conviction became final.40
According to Justice Harlan, there should be two exceptions to
this general rule. First, new rules that place certain kinds of pri-
mary conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
power to proscribe should be applied retroactively. 47 Second, the
retroactive application of a new rule should occur where there
are "claims of nonobservance of those procedures that . . . are
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"48
Justice Harlan originally defined the second exception more
narrowly in Desist, in terms of a "truth-determining test," which
provided that "all 'new' constitutional rules which significantly
improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to be retro-
actively applied on habeas."4 However, in Mackey, Justice
Harlan abandoned the view that a rule must go to the accuracy
of the conviction to be retroactively applied.50 Justice Harlan ex-
plained that this modification resulted from his realization that
the exception must reflect the purpose of habeas, which is "to
inquire into every constitutional defect in any criminal trial,
where the petitioner remains 'in custody' because of the judg-
ment . . . ."51 Justice Harlan therefore modified the exception
because he realized that the inquiry as to innocence or guilt was
not a purpose of the writ; the retroactive application of a new
rule on habeas should not be determined solely by whether or
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding that general principles of adjudication require courts to
rule upon every decisive issue raised by the parties on direct review because there are no
countervailing state interests to be considered when convictions are not yet final).
46 See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 682 (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist, 394 U.S. at 260-61
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding that habeas corpus review involves different concerns
than direct review, and finality concerns must be considered). This is typical of the de-
terrent theory embraced by critics of habeas corpus who generally favor the state's inter-
est in finality over the individual's interest in obtaining relief. They would narrow the
scope of the availability of the writ. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
17 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan gave as an
example "[n]ew 'substantive due process' rules [that] free[] individuals from punishment
for conduct that is constitutionally protected." Id.
41 Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justice Harlan
explained that this exception would require a conviction to be "fundamentally fair and
conducted under those procedures essential to the substance of a full hearing." Mackey,
401 U.S. at 693. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text infra.
4' Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'0 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
SI Id. at 685.
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not the new rule improves fact-finding procedures. 2
Under the modified exception, federal courts would retroac-
tively apply rules which ensure that convictions are "fundamen-
tally fair and conducted under those procedures essential to the
substance of a full hearing."53 According to Justice Harlan, a
"fundamentally fair" conviction was one that resulted from pro-
cedures that were "in accordance with the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'" Justice Harlan believed that the ap-
plication of this exception would vary as societal and judicial
values were altered over time and that the exception would have
to be "worked out in the context of actual cases."115 Thus, al-
though Justice Harlan's general rule of nonretroactivity nar-
rowed the scope of the availability of the writ, the modified ex-
ception broadened the scope of the writ in certain situations by
allowing federal courts to apply retroactively those rules that
implicate "fundamental fairness." Justice Harlan's modification
is important because the Court would later adopt Justice
Harlan's theory without the modification, thus narrowing the
scope of availability considerably.5"
Justice Harlan's theory was only applicable when a rule was
new, and he recognized that it is difficult to discern whether a
decision has established a new rule or whether it has simply ap-
plied a well-established constitutional principle to an analogous
case.57 Although Justice Harlan offered no decisive guidance on
this complex issue, he did note that where the meanings of a
fundamental principle are "altered slowly and subtly .... [i]t
appears very difficult to argue against the application of the
'new' rule in all habeas cases since one could never say with any
52 Id. at 694 ("[I]t is not a principal purpose of the writ to inquire whether a crimi-
nal convict did in fact commit the deed alleged.").
Id. at 693.
Id. at 689. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that "No State shall
...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan cited, as an
example, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that a defendant's right to
counsel at trial is a necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a serious crime).
Justice Harlan would apply Gideon on habeas, even to convictions made final before that
decision was rendered. Interestingly, Gideon was also cited by the Parks Court as an
example of a rule that implicates both fairness and accuracy. Saflie v. Parks, 110 S. Ct.
1257, 1263-64 (1990). See note 120 infra.
"See notes 76-78 infra.
" Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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assurance that this Court would have ruled differently at the
time the petitioner's conviction became final."5 8 The difficulty of
determining whether or not a rule is new continues to plague the
Court in its formulation of the new standard of retroactivity.0
9
In 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky,60 the Court finally held
that cases on direct review would be treated differently from
those on collateral review for purposes of retroactivity. In Grif-
fith the Court adopted Justice Harlan's theory with regard to
cases on direct review, although the Court still applied the Lin-
kletter balancing approach to cases on collateral review. 1 In
1989 the Court accepted Justice Harlan's theory for cases on col-
lateral review, albeit in a modified form, in Teague v. Lane.62
B. The New Standard: Teague and its Progeny
Teague v. Lane established a new standard of retroactivity
for state habeas petitioners.63 This new standard not only se-
verely restricts the ability of state petitioners to obtain the ben-
efit of new rules, but also greatly limits any meaningful review of
their habeas claims on the merits. In the same term, Penry v.
Lynaugh 4 broadened the scope of the Teague decision to in-
clude capital petitioners, although the rule in question in Penry
was declared not to be new and therefore the petitioner obtained
the benefit of the rule in question. It was not until the 1990
8 Id. at 263-64.
" See notes 73, 96-99, 107-17 & 123-27 and accompanying text infra for the Court's
recent definitions of what constitutes a new rule.
60 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
6" Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316 ("In Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to
apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review
violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication."). The Court was expanding, with
some modification, its holding in United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) (holding
that new decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment would be applied retroactively to
all convictions not yet final at the time the new rule is rendered). The Griffith Court also
removed an exception that the Johnson Court had recognized, in whibh there would be
no retroactive application in cases where the rule was a "clear break with the past." See
Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549. According to the Griffith Court, "a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending
on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule consti-
tutes a 'clear break' with the past." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
62 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See notes 74-78 and accompanying text infra for the Teague
plurality's adoption and modification of Justice Harlan's theory.
6 489 U.S. at 299-310.
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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term, with Butler v. McKellar, 5 Saffle v. Parks,6  and Sawyer v.
Smith,6 7 that the true impact of the new standard on the ability
of state capital petitioners to obtain federal habeas review of
their cases on the merits became apparent. In each of these
three cases, the capital petitioner was unable to obtain relief be-
cause of the new retroactivity standard.
1. The Creation of the New Standard
In Teague v. Lane a plurality of the Court adopted Justice
Harlan's approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral re-
view.68 Teague involved a habeas petitioner who urged the Court
to apply retroactively the benefit of a rule of law that was an-
nounced by the Court after the petitioner's conviction had be-
come final. 9 The plurality, adopting a new standard of retroac-
tivity sua sponte, concluded that, "Retroactivity is properly
treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to
the defendant in the case announcing the rule, even-handed jus-
tice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are simi-
larly situated. 7 0 The plurality therefore would not apply a new
rule to the defendant at hand unless all who were in the same
situation as the defendant would also gain the benefit of the
- 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
"' 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
" 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
Teague v7. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292 (1989). The Teague opinion gained the support
of only four members of the Court for those parts of the opinion in which the Court
announced and applied the new retroactivity standard; the central opinion was written
by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy. Justices
White, Blackmun and Stevens did not join in the announcement and application of the
new standard, although they joined in the judgment. Justice Brennan wrote the dissent,
joined by Justice Marshall.
69 Teague urged the Court to apply Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), retroac-
tively, a case that made it easier for a defendant to make out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause by diminishing the necessary eviden-
tiary showing. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 295-96; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Court applied
its new retroactivity analysis. See notes 70-78 and accompanying text infra. Because the
Court decided that the rule Teague sought to have applied was "new" and the rule did
not meet either of the two exceptions to nonretroactivity, the Court denied Teague relief.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 317.
10 Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. Justice Brennan criticized the Court for raising the issue
sua sponte. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'Tjhe rationale for our decisions has
not been undermined by subsequent congressional or judicial action.... I therefore re-
main mystified at where the plurality finds warrant to upset, sua sponte, our time-
honored precedents.").
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rule.11 Furthermore, according to the plurality, because the issue
of retroactivity is a threshold question, a federal court should
not reach the merits of a case if the court has determined that
the rule will not be retroactively applied.7 2 Retroactivity only
becomes an issue if the rule is new. According to the Teague
plurality, "a case announces a new rule when it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Government," or if "the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. '7 3
The plurality incorporated Justice Harlan's views regarding the
general nonretroactivity of new rules to cases on collateral re-
view, along with his original two exceptions. 74
71 Id. at 316. Justice Brennan criticized this approach:
[A]lthough a favorable decision for a petitioner might not extend to another
prisoner whose identical claim has become final, it is at least arguably better
that the wrong done to one person be righted than that none of the injuries
inflicted on those whose convictions have become final be redressed, despite
the resulting inequality in treatment.
Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This part of the decision has also been criticized for
being dishonest because the plurality does tolerate the disparate treatment between peti-
tioners on direct and collateral review by allowing defendants on direct review to receive
the benefit of all new rules even though the procedural stance of the petitioner's cases
may be the result of pure chance. See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra for the
Court's treatment of cases on direct review under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314
(1987). See also LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 122-23 (suggesting that Teague will adversely
affect petitioners who applied for federal habeas relief at the same time but were at
different stages in their appeals when the plurality handed down its decision, and fur-
ther, that perhaps Teague itself should not be retroactively applied to cases already final
before it was decided because it is itself a "new" rule); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-
Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REV. 137, 294-96 (1989) (arguing that the sharp distinction
between direct and collateral review may not be warranted because of irrelevant consid-
erations that can affect the rate of progress of a case, such as a court reporter catching a
cold).
72 Teague, 489 U.S. at 316. The plurality's treatment of retroactivity as a threshold
question before reaching the merits of a habeas claim was sharply criticized by other
members of the Court. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun,
stated that "the plurality invert[ed] the proper order of adjudication. . . . [U]ntil a rule
is set forth, it would be extremely difficult to evaluate whether the rule is 'new' at all."
Id. at 319 n.2. According to Justice Brennan, who was joined in his dissent by Justice
Marshall, "the plurality [precludes] the federal courts from considering on collateral re-
view a vast range of important constitutional challenges; where those challenges have
merit, it would bar the vindication of personal constitutional rights. . . ." Id. at 326-27.
See also notes 143-49 and accompanying text infra for a further discussion of the
problems of treating retroactivity as a threshold question and of separating rules from
the cases to which they relate.
" Id. at 301.
" Id. at 307-10.
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The first exception adopted by the Teague plurality was
that "a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'cer-
tain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."'"
The second exception allowed retroactive effect for "watershed
rules of criminal procedure," which were defined as "those new
procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate convic-
tion is seriously diminished." 6 The plurality did not adopt Jus-
tice Harlan's modification of this exception, which had removed
the requirement that a rule must go to the accuracy of the con-
viction in order to meet the exception.77 The Court's narrow def-
inition of fundamental fairness in terms of accuracy means that
there will be fewer new rules that can be retroactively applied,
therefore resulting in fewer instances in which a state habeas
corpus petitioner will benefit from a new rule of constitutional
law.78
After Teague the Court applied its retroactivity analysis in
the capital sentencing context in Penry v. Lynaugh.79 In Penry a
75 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The plurality did not alter the first Harlan exception. See note 47 and ac-
companying text supra.
489 U.S. at 311, 313.
' Id. at 312 ("We believe it desirable to combine the accuracy element of the Desist
version of the second exception with the Mackey requirement that the procedure at issue
must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial"). See notes 49-56 supra for a dis-
cussion of Justice Harlan's modification.
78 The plurality conceded that "[b]ecause we operate from the premise that such
procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we
believe it unlikely that many such components of due process have yet to emerge." Id. at
313. This limitation on the scope of the second exception was sharply criticized by other
members of the Court. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blacknmun,
stated that "[tihe plurality wrongly resuscitates Justice Harlan's early view, indicating
that the only procedural errors deserving correction on collateral review are those that
undermine 'an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.... ."' Id. at 321. Addition-
ally, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, stated that "the plural-
ity's decision to. . .link the availability of relief to guilt or innocence when the outcome
of a case is not 'dictated' by precedent would apparently prevent a great many Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment cases from being brought on federal habeas." Id. at
334. Justice White, although he wrote separately, did not comment on this departure
from Harlan's modification. See notes 153-58 & 176-83 and accompanying text infra for a
further discussion of this exception, as well as possible legislative reform.
79 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). See Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2 (plurality noted that
although the issue before the Court did not involve a capital petitioner, the analysis
would be properly applied in capital cases). But see id. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (noting that finality concerns were inapplicable to the capital sentencing context).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
majority of the Court firmly established the Teague plurality's
views.80 The capital petitioner in Penry claimed that the Texas
death penalty statute, as applied in his case, was unconstitu-
tional because the sentencing jury had not been allowed to con-
sider fully and give effect to all of the mitigating evidence. 1 The
Court held that granting petitioner's request for relief did not
involve the application of a new rule. The rule that Penry sought
to be applied, that, upon request, Texas juries must be given
instructions that allow them to give effect to mitigating evidence
in determining whether a defendant should be sentenced to
death, was dictated by precedent and did not impose a new obli-
gation on the state of Texas.2
The dissent, by Justice Scalia, vigorously attacked the ma-
jority for its reading of Teague with regard to what constitutes a
new rule.8 3 According to the dissent, "a 'new rule' . . must in-
clude not only a new rule that replaces an old one, but a new
rule that replaces palpable uncertainty as to what the rule might
be."8s4 According to Justice Scalia, therefore, the rule in Penry
80 Penry, 492 U.S. at 313-15. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion and Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined in the judgment. Although Justice
O'Connor also wrote the opinion in Teague, her opinion in Penry was joined only by the
Justices who had refused to join the Teague plurality. See note 68 supra. In Penry the
Court employed the Teague analysis; the primary disagreement within the Court con-
cerned the issue of whether or not the rule that Penry sought to have applied was new,
8" There was a second and unrelated issue in the case: whether it was "cruel and
unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth amendment, to execute a mentally re-
tarded person . . . with [petitioner's] reasoning capacity. . . ... Id. at 328. This issue is
not relevant to this Note, except for its minor modification of the first Teague exception
to also cover "rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defend-
ants because of their status or offense." Id. at 330. The Court held that although this
second issue would involve the creation and application of a new rule, the first exception
was applicable; but, upon reaching the merits, the Court declined to announce such a
rule. Id. at 330.
82 Id. at 315-19. According to the Court, it was clear at the time of petitioner's con-
viction that Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982), prohibited a state from "prevent[ing] the sentencer from considering and giving
effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character or to the circum-
stances of the offense that mitigates against imposing the death penalty." Penry, 492
U.S. at 318.
83 Id. at 351-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although Jus-
tice Scalia joined the parts with regard to the application of Teague to the capital sen-
tencing context, he disagreed with the holding that the rule in question was not new.
8 Id. at 352. According to Justice Scalia, "[11f Teague does not apply to a claimed
'inherency' as vague and debatable as that in the present case, then it applies only to
habeas requests for plain overruling. . .." Id. at 353. In the 1990 term, Justice Scalia
would be assured that this was not true-that Teague would indeed apply to a broad
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was new because it was neither dictated nor compelled by prece-
dent, and the Court's holding therefore demonstrated that
"Teague [was] adopted and gutted in the same Term."8
2. The Application of the Standard to Capital Petitioners:
The Butler-Parks-Sawyer Trilogy
Although the dissenters in Penry were disturbed by the de-
cision, they formed the majority in Butler v. McKellar, Saffle v.
Parks, and Sawyer v. Smith, and applied the Teague analysis to
deny the application of a new rule to a state capital petitioner in
each case."6 The Court not only embraced the reasoning of the
Teague plurality on the definition of a new rule, it extended the
analysis and declared, "The 'new rule' principle . . . validates
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary
to later decisions. '8 7
As a result of Butler, Parks, and Sawyer a federal court
that reviews a state capital petitioner's application for federal
habeas corpus relief must first determine the threshold question
of whether or not the rule sought to be applied is capable of
retroactive application.8 The court will not consider the merits
of the case unless the rule is capable of retroactive application.8
If the rule is not clearly dictated by precedent and state courts
could not have reasonably anticipated it, the court wil declare it
to be new and will not apply it retroactively unless one of two
range of situations. Cf. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1222 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Under the definition of 'prevailing law' embraced today, federal courts may
not entertain habeas petitions challenging state-court rejections of constitutional claims
unless those state decisions are clearly erroneous."). See notes 86-131 and accompanying
text infra for the Court's most recent retroactivity decisions.
86 Penry, 492 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86 Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Butler v. McKellar, and Justice Kennedy
wrote the opinions in Saffle v. Parks and Sawyer v. Smith. Justices White, O'Connor,
and Scalia joined all three opinions, and Justice Brennan wrote dissents for all three
decisions and was joined in each one by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
8' Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990). This is the view embraced by habeas
critics, those who adopt the narrow view of the scope of habeas corpus. This view posits
that state court final judgments should be interfered with only under limited circum-
stances, thus expressing a high regard for federal-state comity. See notes 28-29 and ac-
companying text supra.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989).
80 Id. at 316.
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narrow exceptions is met.90 The Court's application of the ex-
ceptions in Butler, Parks, and Sawyer demonstrates that the ex-
ceptions can be difficult, if not almost impossible, to meet. Thus
most petitioners will be denied the benefit of new rules and will
have to suffer the consequences of their convictions-in some
cases death. The Court's interpretation of the retroactivity anal-
ysis in these cases may result in the execution of a prisoner who
could not constitutionally be convicted on the law as it exists
today.
In Butler a capital petitioner sought to have the Court ret-
roactively apply the rule announced in Arizona v. Roberson,"'
which barred police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's
request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation.2
Roberson was decided on the same day that Butler's conviction
became final.93 The Court held that Roberson had announced a
new rule since its result had not been dictated by precedent ex-
isting at the time Butler's conviction became final, and the
Court denied Butler habeas relief.9 4
Butler contended that Roberson was not a new rule, because
the Roberson Court had said that Roberson's case was directly
controlled by Edwards v. Arizona,9 5 which was decided before
90 Id. at 311-14; Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18.
, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
92 Id. Roberson was arrested for burglary and after the arresting officer informed
him of his constitutional rights, Roberson requested an attorney and chose to remain
silent. Id. at 678. While Roberson was in custody, another officer interrogated him about
a second and unrelated burglary. Id. After this officer informed Roberson of his rights,
Roberson gave an incriminating statement with regard to the second burglary. Id. The
Court held that the interrogation regarding the second burglary was barred by Rober-
son's earlier request for counsel on the initial burglary charge. Id.
11 It is clear that Butler's situation would have been covered by Roberson's restric-
tions if Roberson had been decided before Butler's case became final on direct review.
Butler was arrested on an assault and battery charge, for which he requested and re-
tained an attorney. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1214. While in custody, Butler was informed
that he was a suspect in a separate murder investigation. Id. at 1215. After receiving
Miranda warnings, Butler signed waiver of rights forms and made incriminating state-
ments during the police interrogation that followed. Id. Under Roberson the police inter.
rogation concerning the murder would have been barred by Butler's earlier request for
counsel on the assault and battery charge.
94 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18.
9 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Edwards the Court held that "when an accused has in-
voked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of
that right cannot be established by showing that he responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." Id. at 484-85. In Ed-
wards the second interrogation involved the same offenses as the first interrogation. Id.
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Butler's conviction became final. The Butler Court responded by
stating that "the fact that a court says that its decision is within
the 'logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is
'controlled' by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of
deciding whether the current decision [was] a 'new rule' under
Teague."9 In addition, the fact that other courts reached "rea-
sonable contrary conclusions" on the same issue is evidence that
the rule is new and not "dictated by precedent. ' '9 7 The Court
emphasized its deference to state court decisions as it applied its
analysis to the case at hand:
That the outcome in Roberson was susceptible to debate among rea-
sonable minds is evidenced further by the differing positions taken by
[various lower courts] .... It would not have been an illogical or
even a grudging application of Edwards to decide that it did not ex-
tend to the facts of Roberson.8
According to the Court, "The 'new rule' principle. . . validates
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary
to later decisions."99 Since the Court concluded that Roberson
was indeed a new rule, the Court next inquired whether one of
the two Teague exceptions to nonretroactivity had been met.
The first exception was deemed "clearly inapplicable" be-
cause Roberson had not proscribed the prosecution of murder
nor had it addressed any "categorical guarantees accorded by
the Constitution." 100 The second exception was deemed similarly
inapplicable because "a violation of Roberson's added restric-
tions on police investigatory procedures would not seriously di-
minish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination" of
innocence or guilt.101
at 478-79.
9 Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
97 Id.
26 Id. at 1217-18.
99 Id. at 1217. Justice Brennan criticized the majority for its broad definition of a
new rule. See id. at 1225 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[The Court's decision today denies
federal courts the role on habeas review that Congress envisioned because it limits them
to remedying only clearly unreasonable state-court applications of federal law, rather
than all erroneous ones.").
20' Id. at 1218 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. CL 2934 (1989)). See note 81
supra.
"I Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218. The Court added that in this case a violation of Rob-
erson's added restrictions might actually increase the likelihood of an accurate determi-
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Butler's death sentence therefore remained intact because
the guarantees of Roberson were new and did not fall within a
special exception for those new rules that should be retroactively
applied to cases on collateral review. However, Butler did not
clarify when it is that a rule is not new or suggest what types of
new rules may be given retroactive effect. Parks and Sawyer did
not clear up these issues; what they did make clear was the
Court's strong commitment to nonretroactivity as a defense to
the request for federal habeas corpus relief. Additionally, Parks
and Sawyer revealed that sentencing procedures, like police in-
terrogations, are not likely to fall within either of the nonretro-
activity exceptions.
In Parks a capital petitioner contended that the an-
tisympathy instruction delivered in the penalty phase of his trial
amounted to constitutional error.102 According to Parks, the in-
struction in effect told the jury to disregard the mitigating evi-
dence that he had presented, in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment as interpreted by Lockett v. Ohio103 and Eddings v.
Oklahoma,04 both decided before his conviction became final.100
Parks contended that the result he sought, that "jurors be al-
lowed to base the sentencing decision upon the sympathy they
feel for the defendant after hearing his mitigating evidence," did
not involve the creation of a new rule.1 08 The Court disagreed.
The Court held that the principle Parks sought involved the cre-
ation of a new rule as defined in both Teague and Butler.107
nation of innocence or guilt. Id.
102 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1259 (1990). The following was the challenged instruction: "You
are the judges of the facts. . . .You must avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment,
passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence." Parks v. Brown,
840 F.2d 1496, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
103 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (the sentencer may not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character that is proffered as a basis
for a sentence less than death).
104 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (state conviction vacated because state court refused
to allow the sentencer to consider defendant's unhappy upbringing and emotional distur-
bance as a mitigating circumstance).
101 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1258-60 (1990).
106 Id. at 1260.
107 Id. Additionally, the Court could not announce the new rule that Parks sought
because of the Teague plurality's declaration that it would "refuse to announce a new
rule in a given case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the
case at hand and to all others similarly situated." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316
(1989). See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989) ("Under Teague, new rules
will not be applied or announced in cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of
[Vol. 57:865
HABEAS CORPUS AND RETROACTIVITY
The Court concluded that neither Lockett nor Eddings dic-
tated the result urged by Parks because the issues in those cases
differed from the issue before the Court.108 Those cases dealt
with what mitigating evidence the jury must be permitted to
consider, and Parks's claim dealt with how the jury must con-
sider mitigating evidence."0 9 According to the Court, because the
issue presented was different, it followed that the state courts
which rejected challenges similar to Parks's were not unreasona-
ble in doing so.110 The Court noted that its "task [was] to deter-
mine whether a state court considering Parks' claim at the time
his conviction became final would have felt compelled by ex-
isting precedent to conclude that the rule Parks [sought] was
required by the Constitution."111 According to the Court, the
rule was not so compelled and therefore was new.112
Parks had also contended that the reasoning in California v.
Brown,'"s decided after his conviction became final, was applica-
ble to his case because Brown specifically discussed how evi-
two exceptions.").
10" According to the majority:
[Tihere is no dispute as to the precise holding in each of the two cases: that
the State cannot bar relevant mitigating evidence from being presented and
considered during the penalty phase of a capital trial
Lockett and Eddings do not speak directly, if at all, to the issue presented
here: whether the State may instruct the sentencer to render its decision on
the evidence without sympathy.
Id. at 1261.
109 Id. The Court also compared the claim here with that in Penry, where the relief
sought did not call for the creation of a new rule. Penry was commanded by precedent,
because the issue there was whether or not mitigating evidence could be given any effect
at alL Id. at 1261-62. See notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
110 Id. at 1261. According to the dissent, this reliance on state courts was misplaced.
See id. at 1265 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the Court's novel 'reasonableness' review of
state court convictions is incompatible with the fundamental purposes of habeas
corpus").
II Id. at 1260.
Ila Id. at 1261. ("Even were we to agree with Parks' assertion that our decisions...
inform, or even control or govern, the analysis of his claim, it does not follow that they
compel the rule that Parks seeks."). In his dissent, Justice Brennan accused the majority
of mischaracterizing Parks's claim. According to Justice Brennan, Parks's argument was
that the jury could have misinterpreted the antisympathy instruction as barring a con-
sideration of mitigating evidence. Id. at 1265 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The issue would
therefore be what evidence the jury must consider, and not how the jury must consider
mitigating evidence, and would fall within the ambit of Lockett and Eddings. Id. at 1266.
213 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (antisympathy instruction during penalty phase of capital
trial that prevented jurors from considering emotional responses not based on the evi-
dence did not violate the Constitution).
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dence must be considered. 114 Although the Court in Brown ap-
proved an antisympathy instruction that prevented jurors from
considering emotional responses not based on the evidence,
Parks argued that the jury instruction in this case was distin-
guishable and dictated a different result.1 5 The Court was skep-
tical whether Brown was even pertinent to Parks's claim;11 nev-
ertheless, even if Brown was pertinent, Parks could not gain any
benefit from Brown. Brown was decided after Parks's conviction
had become final, and the Court found that Brown was not dic-
tated by precedent because no past cases were relevant to that
issue. 1 7 It was a new rule.
Since the relief Parks sought was inevitably based on a new
rule, the Court investigated the Teague exceptions.1 8 The first
exception was deemed inapplicable, because the rule did not
''place a class of private conduct beyond the power of the state
to proscribe," nor did the rule "prohibit a certain category of
punishment on a particular class of persons."" 9 The second ex-
ception was also deemed inapplicable because "the objectives of
fairness and accuracy [were] more likely to be threatened than
promoted by a rule allowing the sentence to turn not on whether
the defendant, in the eyes of the community, is morally deserv-
ing of the death sentence, but on whether the defendant can
strike an emotional chord in a juror." 20 The Court therefore
114 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1263. In Brown, the judge instructed the jury not to be
"swayed by 'mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling.'" Brown, 479 U.S. at 542.
,' According to the Court:
Parks' argument relies upon a negative inference: because we concluded in
Brown that it was permissible under the Constitution to prevent the jury from
considering emotions not based upon the evidence, it follows that the Constitu-
tion requires that the jury be allowed to consider and give effect to emotions
that are based upon mitigating evidence.
Parks, 110 S. Ct at 1263.
" Id. ("[We doubt that this inference follows from Brown or is consistent with our
precedents.").
" The Court again distinguished the issue of what evidence the jury must consider
from the issue of how the jury must consider it; because Lockett and Eddings dealt with
the former issue and Brown dealt with the latter, those cases did not dictate the result in
Brown. See id.
I' Id.
"' Id.
120 Id. at 1263-64. The Court cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which
held that a defendant had the right to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for
serious offenses, as an example of the type of rule that would fall within this second
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would not overturn Parks's death sentence because this would
have required the retroactive application of a new rule, and the
method by which sentencing juries consider mitigating evidence
was not the kind of rule that deserved retroactive effect. Parks
signified that the Court would closely scrutinize rules which im-
plicate sentencing procedures and would hesitate to give such
rules retroactive effect.
Sawyer not only continued the nonretroactivity trend of
Parks, but it also demonstrated the Court's unwillingness to
broaden the exceptions to nonretroactivity to meet the needs of
state capital petitioners. In Sawyer a capital petitioner claimed
that the prosecutor's closing argument violated the Eighth
Amendment by diminishing the jury's sense of responsibility for
the capital sentencing decision.12 Sawyer relied on Caldwell v.
Mississippi,122 decided one year after Sawyer's conviction be-
came final, which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of the death sentence by a sentencer that has
been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determin-
ing the appropriateness of a capital sentence rests elsewhere.
The Court held that Caldwell was a new rule.1 23According to the Court, Caldwell was the first case to invali-
date a prosecutorial argument as impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment. 24 At the time that Sawyer's conviction be-
came final, there had been indications in the Court's decisions
that the Caldwell rule was not required by the Eighth Amend-
ment. 2 Even though state courts may have been incorrect in
exception. Id. Interestingly, Justice Harlan cited the same case in Mackey when he mod-
ified this exception to eliminate the "accuracy" requirement. See note 55 supra.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that capital sentencing procedures should fall
within this exception because the refusal to apply this exception to a capital sentencing
error was "remarkably insensitive to the fundamental premise upon which our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is built." Id. at 1269. See notes 166-70 infra for a discussion
of "death is different" arguments.
121 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2825 (1990). The following were among the challenged remarks:
"The law provides that if you find [aggravating] circumstances then what you are doing
as a juror, you yourself will not be sentencing Robert Sawyer to the electric chair" and
"All you are saying is that this man from his actions could be prosecuted to the fullest
extent of the law. No more and no less." Id.
12 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
11 Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2826 (1990).
124 Id. at 2828.
121 Id. at 2828-29. However, according to Justice Brennan, the rule that Sawyer
sought to have applied was not new at all. See id. at 2834 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('The
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their characterization of these decisions, it was because the
courts were not put on notice; there was some reason for doubt
as to how the Court would eventually decide the issue.1 28 While
there were state courts that did prohibit prosecutorial comments
such as those in Caldwell, this did not support the notion that
the rule was not new, since state courts do not inform the
Court's decisions or impose standards upon the Court.12 7
Looking to the Teague exceptions to nonretroactivity, the
Court noted that the first exception was inapplicable because
the rule which Sawyer sought to have applied was not one which
"place[ed] an entire category of primary conduct beyond the
reach of the criminal law," nor did the rule "prohibit imposition
of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because
of their status or offense.' 128 With regard to the second excep-
tion, Sawyer contended that it should have been read to include
new rules of capital sentencing that improve the accuracy and
fairness of capital sentencing judgments. 2 " The Court rejected
this reading of the exception. 1' 0 The Court was unwilling to ex-
pand the scope of this exception; according to the Court, "It
[was] difficult to see any limit to the definition of the second
exception if cast as proposed by petitioner.' ' 3 1 The Sawyer
Court thus made it clear that it would not expand the reach of
this exception because to do so would weaken the nonretroactiv-
ity defense.
3. The Present Standard and the "Habeas Debate"
From Teague to Sawyer the Supreme Court's habeas debate
has raged. The members of the Court who support the new stan-
roots of the Caldwell rule can be traced directly to this Court's Eighth Amendment deci-
sions demanding heightened reliability in capital sentencing.").
126 Id. at 2828-29.
127 Id. at 2830-31.
Id. at 2831.
1 Id. Although Justice Brennan did not agree that the rule was new, see note 125
supra, he argued in the alternative that even if it were new the second exception should
have applied because the accuracy of the sentencing jury's determination was under-
mined by virtue of the prosecutorial comments. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2838-41 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
'10 Id. at 2831-32. According to the Court, "In practical effect, petitioner asks us to
overrule our decision in Penry that Teague applies to new rules of capital sentencing.
This we decline to do." Id. at 2832.
131 Id. at 2831-32.
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dard of retroactivity in each case emphasized the views of the
critics of habeas corpus. These critics advocate a narrow scope of
the writ and focus on the protection of the state interest and
how this interest will be furthered or hindered by the retroactive
application of the new rule.132 This focus was so strong in the
recent cases that the importance of ensuring the rights of the
individual was not even mentioned as a supplementary pur-
pose.13 There was no discussion of a "balance" that must be
struck between competing objectives.
On the other hand, the members of the Court who disagreed
with the new standard of retroactivity stressed the role of indi-
vidual rights as the primary purpose of habeas corpus.' 3' Ac-
cording to the dissenters, while concerns for state sovereignty
are not irrelevant, they cannot form the sole basis for the writ 35
It is therefore true that state courts need only adjudicate cases
on the basis of prevailing law, but "prevailing law" must not be
defined too narrowly. 36 The dissenters contended that state
courts must be encouraged to adjudicate federal claims not only
" The majority opinions of Butler, Parks, and Sawyer demonstrate the Court's
preoccupation with the state courts' interpretations of existing law. This is apparent in
the Court's repeated declaration that the "new rule" principle "validate[s] reasonable,
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they
are shown to be contrary to later decisions." Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827; Saflle v. Parks,
110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990).
The majority opinions stressed the needs of the state courts upon federal habeas
review without considering the other party that exists in every habeas proceeding-the
defendant. The entire retroactivity analysis was focused on the state courts and not at all
on the individuals for whom the writ was initially designed.
,' See, e.g., Sawyer 110 S. Ct. at 2833 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I continue
to regard the Court's effort to curtail the scope of federal habeas as inconsistent with
Congress's intent."); Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1265 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the
Court's novel 'reasonableness' review of state court convictions is incompatible with the
fundamental purposes of habeas corpus."); Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1225 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]oday's decision. . . overrides Congress' will and leaves federal judicial pro-
tection of fundamental constitutional rights during the state criminal process solely to
this Court upon direct review.").
'" See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1226 (Brennan, J., dissenting) C" 'This Court has never
held.., that finality, standing alone, provides a sufficient reason for federal courts to
compromise their protection of constitutional rights under § 2254' . . . until today.")
(quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 15 (1984)).
"' See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[A]djudication according to prevailing law means far more than obeying precedent by
perfunctorily applying holdings in previous cases to virtually identical fact patterns.
Rather, such adjudication requires a judge to evaluate both the content of previously
ennunciated legal rules and the breadth of their application.").
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in accordance with existing precedent but with the principles
that underlie existing precedent.137 The dissenters criticized the
majority for defeating the "purpose" of federal habeas
corpus-to both ensure that state courts abide by established
constitutional standards and provide state petitioners with a
remedy for unlawful state deprivations of their federally pro-
tected rights.13 8
The debate within the Court over the present retroactivity
standard thus reflects the traditional habeas debate over the pri-
mary purpose of the writ. This is apparent in the majority's and
the dissent's differing emphases on the interests of the state and
the individual in the determination of the proper standard of
retroactivity for cases on collateral review. This debate is far
from academic for the state capital petitioner: the way the Court
has resolved the habeas debate on retroactivity could mean the
difference between life and death.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW STANDARD
The application of the new standard of retroactivity in But-
ler, Parks and Sawyer reveals the tension between the new stan-
dard of retroactivity and the situation that confronts state capi-
tal petitioners. The application of the Teague-Penry analysis to
Butler, Parks and Sawyer demonstrates how states can carry
out death sentences that, although once valid, could not be im-
posed today because of subsequent rulings. In Justice Brennan's
view, the application of the retroactivity analysis to capital cases
means that "despite constitutional defects in the state processes
leading to their conviction or sentencing, state prisoners. . . will
die . . . because state courts were reasonable, even though
wrong.' 1 39 Nonetheless, in Butler, Parks and Sawyer the Court
did not focus on the fact that the petitioners were facing the
death penalty, except to note that Penry extended the Teague
analysis to cover both capital and noncapital cases. 40
Although Penry extended the Teague analysis to capital
cases, the petitioner in Penry was able to benefit from the con-
See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1221-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"~ Id. at 1224.
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1225-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140 Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2832 (1990); Saffme v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257,
1261 (1990); Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1216.
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stitutional rule in question because the rule was held not to be
new.141 According to Justice Brennan in his Parks dissent, "The
Court display[ed] undue eagerness to apply the new standard
for retroactivity. . . at the expense of thoughtful legal analysis.
I cannot countenance such carelessness when a life is at
stake."'1 42 Not until Butler, Parks and Sawyer did a capital peti-
tioner suffer because of the "new rule" analysis. These cases un-
cover how restrictions on the availability of habeas corpus can
be particularly devastating for the capital petitioner.
The restrictions on habeas corpus created by the new retro-
activity analysis are particularly problematic for several reasons.
First, the Court's treatment of retroactivity as a threshold ques-
tion is problematic because federal courts will often not reach
the merits of habeas claims. 143 The constitutional issue involved
in a habeas petition, for example the assurance of an individual's
constitutional rights, often implicates concerns other than final-
ity, but the the treatment of retroactivity as a threshold ques-
tion allows the federal habeas court to ignore these other con-
cerns.14 4 This is harmful to state habeas petitioners who have
valid constitutional claims-especially those petitioners facing
death row. In the words of Justice Brennan, "under the guise of
fine-tuning the definition of 'new rule,' the Court strips state
prisoners of virtually any meaningful federal review of the con-
stitutionality of their incarceration.' 4 5 Accordingly, the Court
strips capital petitioners of a meaningful review of the constitu-
tionality of their executions. 46
Second, although a federal court will address the merits of a
habeas claim if the rule is capable of retroactive application, the
"retroactivity threshold" is a tough one for state petitioners to
meet: a petitioner's constitutional claims must either involve
" See Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1989), afl'd, 110 S. Ct.
2822 (1990) (discussing the TeaguelPenry analysis, and how these two cases left the
"new rule" inquiry in a state of flux).
42 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
M See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
"' See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (this method of
analysis "stymies the resolution of substantial and unheralded constitutional
questions").
"Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'"See Marcia Coyle et. al., High Court's Divide Deepens on Death Penalty, NAT'L
L.J., May 7, 1990, at 5 (expressing concern about the Court's elevation of procedure over
constitutional merits in capital cases).
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rules that are not new or, if the rules involved are new, they
must be recognized by an exception. Federal courts will not gen-
erally apply new rules retroactively, and with the Court's broad
definition of a "new rule," the courts may declare most, if not
all, rules to be new. The Court's exceptions to the general rule of
nonretroactivity thus become extremely important because the
exceptions may provide the only method by which a federal
court will be able to review the merits of a state capital peti-
tioner's claim; unfortunately, the exceptions are also limited in
scope and may not enable a federal court to reach the merits.
When examining whether a "new rule" can be retroactively
applied through one of the two exceptions to the general rule,
the Court examines the new rule apart from the particular facts
of the case under review. 147 The exceptions "apply to rules that
in the run of cases affect reliability or fairness, irrespective of
whether the rule would have that effect in the particular case
before the Court.' 14 The court will look at the type of rule to
determine if the rule meets the exception; if the rule does not
meet the exception the court will not look at the factual setting
of a case to see if the petitioner's situation is deserving of retro-
active application. 1 9 The problem is intensified for the state
capital petitioner who attempts to gain the benefit of a new rule
which implicates the constitutional validity of her conviction or
sentence because the application of one of these exceptions may
be the only way for her to avoid death. Moreover, because the
exceptions are so narrowly defined, they offer little solace to the
capital petitioner.
The first exception, which applies to "rules that place an
entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of the
47 See LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 118 (both exceptions are "rule-not petitioner-
specific"). See also note 72 supra for a discussion of the problems of considering rules
separately from the cases to which they relate.
148 Id..
149 The Court ran afoul of Justice Harlan's admonition that exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of nonretroactivity should take into consideration the facts of actual cases. See
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 694 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Other possi-
ble exceptions to the finality rule I would leave to be worked out in the context of actual
cases brought before us that raise the issue."). See also Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct.
1212, 1224 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he federal court must determine for it-
self the proper scope of constitutional principles and their application to the particular
factual circumstances.").
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criminal law to proscribe,"150 is not as controversial as the sec-
ond exception, which applies to new "watershed rules of crimi-
nal procedure," rules "without which the likelihood of an accu-
rate conviction would be seriously diminished."' 01  Both
exceptions are extremely difficult to meet, but the first one is
not as controversial because it is clear and not frequently in-
voked. It has not been significantly altered since Justice Harlan
first recognized it as an exception in Desist and further refined
it in Mackey.152 The second exception is particularly controver-
sial because it specifically focuses on new rules that improve
fact-finding and ignores other types of new rules that serve dif-
ferent, although equally important, goals. ,53 The second excep-
tion does not recognize that certainty as to the guilt of the de-
fendant is not dispositive of whether the defendant's conviction
or sentence has been fairly rendered.1 54 Using factual innocence
as a guide is particularly inappropriate when applied to capital
petitioners. In Butler the new rule that Butler sought to apply
concerned the constitutional validity of his confession, but the
Court decided that this should be subordinated because he had
admitted his guilt.1 5  Additionally, in the capital sentencing con-
text a fundamentally unfair sentencing process may have oc-
curred regardless of the petitioner's conviction. In Parks the
Court would not announce and retroactively apply a rule that
affected the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence be-
cause the value of such a rule was outweighed by the fact that
Parks was guilty and may have been "morally deserving of the
death sentence."158 And in Sawyer the Court would not retroac-
150 See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
' ' See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
252 See notes 47 & 75 and accompanying text supra.
, ' See Leading Cases, supra note 71, at 298 ("Teague ignores the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing between those new constitutional rules directed towards improving factfind-
ing and those designed to further other important values.").
15 See Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds, High Court Closes Door on Mixed Ses-
sion, LEGAL 'ISIFS, July 9, 1990, at 18 (discussing the general trend of the Court to cir-
cumscribe the grounds for attacking convictions when the guilt of the accused is not in
doubt).
155 See Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990) (the Court stated that a
violation of the rule in question might actually increase the accuracy of the conviction).
See also Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263-64 (1990) (the Court stated that fairness
and accuracy were more likely to be threatened than promoted by the application of the
new rule).
I" Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tively apply a new rule which was "designed as an enhancement
of the accuracy of capital sentencing," indicating that the Court
will distinguish rules which enhance the accuracy of the sentenc-
ing phase of a trial from rules which enhance the accuracy of the
guilt phase of a trial.15 Needless to say, a penalty of death is
different from all other sentences in terms of severity and irrevo-
cability, and it is important that fairness and reliability are en-
sured as to both the conviction and the imposition of the death
sentence.158
Under the Court's new retroactivity analysis, a state capital
petitioner must confront not only the possible denial of her re-
quest for federal habeas corpus relief, but even more painful,
must first confront the possibility that the reviewing court will
not even address the merits of her case. The court will analyze
the rule she seeks to apply independent of her particular claims.
If the rule is not new, or if the new rule happens to fit within
one of the narrow exceptions to the general standard of nonret-
roactivity for cases on collateral review, the court will review the
merits of her case. However, with the analysis as it now stands,
this will be the rare case.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The Court's "bright-line retroactivity rule,' 59 as established
in Teague and Penry and applied in Butler, Parks and Sawyer
is extremely controversial. Aside from the typical issues involved
in the habeas debate, habeas defenders have attacked the inap-
propriate way in which the Court has reached its decisions. The
dissenters claim that the Court's decisions have been reached
"at the expense of thoughtful legal analysis"1 0 and have been
propelled by "[r]esult, not reason."'' The Court has been con-
sistent in erecting barriers to state petitioners' attainment of
federal habeas corpus relief, '6  and the Court seems to have
reached its recent retroactivity decisions with this goal in mind.
" Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2832 (1990).
288 See generally George W. Sherrell, Note, Successive Chances for Life: Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Capital Petitioner, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455, 475
(1989).
188 Leading Cases, supra note 71, at 297.
110 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Xe, Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'e' See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
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Retroactivity has been transformed-but without a method of
principled decision making.163
Now that the Court has spoken, it is essential for Congress
to amend the statute providing federal habeas corpus review for
state petitioners in order to protect state capital petitioners
from the new standard of retroactivity. If Justice Brennan is
correct in his assessment that "the Court has finally succeeded
in its thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus
regime,164 Congress must take action. Justice White, in his
Teague concurrence, stated, "If we are wrong in construing the
reach of the habeas corpus statutes, Congress can of course cor-
rect us. .. ,16 It is time for new legislation on the availability
of federal habeas corpus for state petitioners.
Change is necessary. The question is how this change should
be accomplished in order to alleviate the plight of capital habeas
petitioners. The basic problem is that the current retroactivity
analysis is a strict standard which defines a new rule in broad
terms and generally denies the state petitioner relief based on
new rules, and further provides only very narrow and unaccom-
modating exceptions which do not even ensure that petitioners
will receive a meaningful review of their claims. This is espe-
cially problematic for capital petitioners. Any changes in the ret-
roactivity standard must address this problem; there are a few
potential solutions.
One solution would be to accept the Teague analysis but
make it inapplicable to capital petitioners. 6 ' While concerns
about delays in the enforcement of sentences and the state's in-
terest in finality are important, some have argued that such con-
cerns should give way in the capital case, and capital prisoners
should obtain the benefit of every announced constitutional
rule. 67 Although habeas relief may involve burdens on the
See Leading Cases, supra note 71, at 295 (attacking the Teague plurality's trans-
formation of retroactivity as "misguided and counterproductive" with regard to the gen-
eral concerns of fairness and finality).
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 317 (1989) (White, J., concurring).
This is the proposal of the Civil Rights Committee of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, made before Butler, Parks and Sawyer were decided. See Lma.
AIAN, supra note 2, at 125 (discussing Civil Rights Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Statement Concerning Legislative Modification of Federal
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 Rac. Ass'N. B. Crnr N.Y. 848 (1989)).
6 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that the
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states, these burdens should not force a capital petitioner to
forego a meaningful review of substantial claims by a federal
court."6 8 While it is true that capital petitioners have suffered
from the application of the Teague analysis, a competely differ-
ent standard for capital petitioners may not be the best solution.
"Death is different" arguments69 are valid, but do not necessa-
rily call for a completely different solution to accommodate the
special needs and concerns of capital defendants. The goal of
protecting capital defendants can be accomplished without ig-
noring all other valid concerns. A retroactivity standard that has
as its primary aim the plight of capital habeas petitioners should
not be exclusive; it should be designed with capital petitioners in
mind, yet be applicable to all state habeas petitioners. This as-
sures that not only capital petitioners but all who deserve to
benefit from a particular new rule will benefit. A possible, and
relatively simple, solution that promises to help all state habeas
petitioners would be to return to pre-Teague days, to the Lin-
kletter standard.1 7 0
Under the Linkletter standard, federal courts were able to
review the merits of each claim on a case-by-case basis. Upon
their review of habeas petitions, federal courts would look at the
purpose of the new rule, the reliance of the states on the old
state interest in making a conviction final, which is a major reason for limiting retroac-
tivity in collateral.proceedings, is wholly inapplicable in capital cases) (citing Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
"I See Yackle, supra note 22, at 1011 ("the treatment of substantial claims, particu-
larly in death penalty cases, should not be frustrated by a rush to judgment"). See also
Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2841 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court is
less concerned with safeguarding constitutional rights than with speeding defendants
. . . to the executioner.").
e This is a common name for arguments that propose entirely different standards
for capital petitioners. See Sherrell, supra note 158, at 475-80. See also Sawyer v, Butler,
881 F.2d 1273, 1289-90 (5th Cir. 1989) (denouncing "death is different" arguments in the
context of the application of the second Teague exception), afl'd sub noma. Sawyer v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
170 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See also notes 33-38 and accompa-
nying text supra. This is similar to the solution proposed by Senator Biden, Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, although the Biden bill limited the approach to capital
cases, perhaps unnecessarily. Senator Biden introduced S. 1757, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989), called the "Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1989" (reprinted in 135 CoNe. REC.
S13,472 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1989)). Although Senator Biden introduced the bill before
Butler, Parks and Sawyer were decided, he anticipated the harsh effects of these cases;
the stated purpose of the bill is "to amend title 28, United States Code, to provide spe-
cial habeas corpus procedures in capital cases." Id.
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rule, and the effect on the administration of justice of the retro-
active application of the new rule.171 This approach was capable
of addressing concerns other than finality by balancing compet-
ing interests. 2 It was flexible and a return to it would eliminate
the treatment of retroactivity as a threshold question; however,
it would not necessarily solve all of the problems that presently
confront state habeas petitioners.
The Linkletter analysis may be broader and seemingly more
flexible than the present standard, but questions on the types of
rules that ought to be retroactively applied still exist. A contro-
versy similar to that surrounding the "accuracy" exception of
Teague173 also existed in the years of Linkletter. In Linkletter
the Court, in balancing the factors in the retroactivity analysis,
implied that rules which implicate the "integrity of the fact-
finding process" were more deserving of retroactive applica-
tion.1 74 The dilemma concerning whether or not accuracy and
the reliability of the conviction were of overriding importance in
the retroactivity decision afflicted legal scholars in the aftermath
of Linkletter just as it does today, after Teague.lG The problem
of using accuracy as a guide to granting retroactive effect must
171 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637-38.
172 See Leading Cases, supra note 71, at 300 (comparing Linkletter and Teague,
and how the latter obscures the confrontation of competing interests by elevating the
goal of finality over all else); 135 CONG. REc. S13,474 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Biden) (discussing the necessity of reaching a compromise between the right of a
state prisoner to have a full review of all constitutional claims and the interest of the
state in ending unnecessary delay).
"7I See notes 151-58 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the contro-
versy surrounding the second exception to nonretroactivity, for rules that affect the like-
lihood of an accurate conviction.
174 [I]n each of the areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively the
principle that we applied went to the fairness of the trial - the very integrity
of the fact-finding process. Here . . . . [a]il that petitioner attacks is the ad-
missibility of the evidence, the reliability and relevancy of which is not ques-
tioned and which may well have had no effect on the outcome.
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639.
7I See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due
Process of Time and Law, 79 I-AIv. L Rav. 56, 80 (1965) (the principal grounds for
habeas corpus "serves to free prisoners as to whom there is greater doubt than the Con-
stitution allows that they have in fact done the acts which constitute the crime for which
they are being punished"); But see Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and
Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHL L. REv. 719, 747-48 (1966) C'Re-
gardless of whether they affect reliability... newly declared constitutional criminal pro-
cedure rights have one important characteristic in common: they are constitutional
rights, reflecting fundamental norms of the process .. ).
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be solved, and here the Linkletter approach is of little help. A
court hostile to the granting of federal habeas relief could very
easily find a way to manipulate Linkletter's flexible balancing
approach. A return to Linkletter is therefore not a remedy for
the problems that the present retroactivity standard poses for
state petitioners.
The best solution is a retroactivity standard that is flexible
enough to accommodate the needs of both capital and noncapi-
tal petitioners, yet inflexible enough to withstand excessive judi-
cial intervention. The present retroactivity standard could, with
some modification, be much more accommodating to the needs
of all state petitioners. The exceptions should be broadened to
allow petitioners to receive retroactively the benefit of rules that
enhance the fairness, although not necessarily the accuracy, of
their trials.
A third possibility for change would be to accept the
Teague-Sawyer line of cases, but with a proviso: if the new stan-
dard of retroactivity is going to be so strict, defining new rules
very broadly and treating retroactivity as a threshold question,
then the exceptions to nonretroactivity should be formulated so
that habeas petitioners still have the benefit of a new rule when
their convictions or sentences are rendered unfairly but accu-
rately. This is what Justice Harlan eventually advocated; the
misadaptation of his ideas in Teague is where the problems be-
gan. Although Justice Harlan, in Desist, had originally advo-
cated an exception for rules that affect only fact-finding proce-
dures, he changed his position in Mackey, and instead of
confining his concerns to accuracy he embraced retroactivity for
those procedures "'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty.' ,1176 The Teague plurality did not adopt this important
modification- yet Justice Harlan's rationale for the modifica-
tion demonstrates how the Teague plurality erred. 17 The Court
compounded this error by applying this unmodified rule to capi-
tal petitioners in Butler, Parks and Sawyer.
To solve the problems that presently confront state habeas
petitioners, the second exception should have "fundamental fair-
ness" of the trial as its primary aim-in accordance with Justice
'6 See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
177 See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
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Harlan's modification.1 78 Retroactivity of a new rule should be
permitted if the rule affects the fairness of the trial. This excep-
tion must be read broadly to ensure that important constitu-
tional guarantees are preserved. A broader exception will encom-
pass a larger variety of important new rules of constitutional
law, the retroactivity of which will properly allow federal courts
to review the merits of a larger variety of claims.17 9 The Four-
teenth Amendment has incorporated many of the procedural
safeguards of the federal Bill of Rights, and since federal habeas
corpus empowers the federal courts to issue writs "in all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in vio-
lation of the Constitution,"18 0 the second exception cannot ig-
nore these protections.18'
Accuracy does not have to be included in the definition of
the "fundamental fairness" exception because an inaccurate con-
viction or sentencing procedure is by definition unfair. The re-
verse is not true-unfairness can occur even with accuracy. A
version of the second exception that follows these suggestions
would dramatically improve the situation of state capital peti-
tioners,' because the exception would be more attentive to
claims involving unconstitutional sentencing procedures, as well
as to claims involving convictions that result from unconstitu-
tional police interrogations. 83
1'8 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 322 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[Flactual innocence is too capricious a factor by which to determine if a procedural
change is sufficiently 'bedrock' or 'watershed' to justify application of the fundamental
fairness exception."). See also note 78 supra, discussing the division within the Teague
Court on this issue.
179 See notes 143-58 and accompanying text supra.
'80 Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867) (current version codified at
§§ 2241-2255)(1982)). See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
181 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. lav. 423 (1961). Justice Brennan had predicted that
"as the Supreme Court brings state criminal proceedings more and more within the pro-
tections and limitations of the Federal Bill of Rights, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
will correspondingly expand." Id. at 440. The Court's recent retroactivity decisions have
proved his prediction to be wrong.
18I I would propose the following amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the statute that
provides conditions for federal habeas review for state petitioners:
All new rules of constitutional law that affect the fundamental fairness of any
phase of a criminal trial must be retroactively applied to state petitioners on
federal habeas corpus. Fundamental fairness includes all rules that implicate
the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
83 See LmBmAN, supra note 2, at 120-21.
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The value of a modified exception is especially apparent
when it is applied to Butler, Parks and Sawyer. The rule that
Butler wanted to have applied would have been available under
this "fundamental fairness" exception.18' While the Roberson
rule was established after Butler's conviction had become final,
the rule implicated the constitutional fairness of a trial. Rober-
son concerned important principles of Fifth Amendment juris-
prudence based on Miranda and its progeny. 85 Although it may
not have been clear until after his conviction became final, But-
ler's privilege against self-incrimination was clearly interfered
with as a result of the unconstitutional custodial interrogation
followed by the use of this evidence at trial.18 6 Butler's trial was
therefore fundamentally unfair; although the rule in Roberson
may have been new, Butler deserved to benefit from its impor-
tant constitutional guarantee of fairness. The accuracy of But-
ler's conviction would have been irrelevant with the "fundamen-
tal fairness" exception because this version of the exception
would recognize that constitutional guarantees such as Miranda
warnings involve concerns other than accuracy.
Parks's conviction involved the constitutional issue of what
mitigating evidence a sentencing jury can hear and how it must
be considered.18 7 The rule in Brown implicated the Eighth
Amendment's need for reliability in death sentence determina-
tions, yet the Court would not consider giving the rule retroac-
tive application.' Instead of examining the value of the consti-
'8, See notes 91-101 and accompanying text supra.
I85 Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1220 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In
Roberson we simply applied the legal principle established in Miranda and reconfirmed
in Edwards to a set of facts that was not dissimilar in any salient way."). Although it was
debatable whether the rule was new, its constitutional implications should nevertheless
require its retroactive application; the "fundamental fairness" exception would ensure
this result.
116 See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 n.4 (1988) (quoting Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S 707 (1979) quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)):
"The rule in Miranda . . . was based on this Court's perception that the law-
yer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his unique ability
to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interro-
gation . . . . [Tihe Court [in Miranda] found that 'the right to have counsel
present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege under the system' established by the Court."
(emphasis added).
' See notes 102-12 and accompanying text supra.
188 See notes 113-20 and accompanying text supra.
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tutional right involved in the sentencing procedure, the Court
concerned itself with the accuracy of the jury's determination at
the guilt phase of the trial. The "fundamental fairness" excep-
tion would require federal courts to apply retroactively any new
rule involving how a jury must consider mitigating evidence
under the Eighth Amendment, regardless of the innocence or
guilt of the petitioner.
Sawyer's petition also concerned important Eighth Amend-
ment issues.189 Caldwell determined that it was unfair for a de-
fendant to be convicted by a jury that is misinformed about its
constitutional obligation.190 Even if that obligation was not rec-
ognized until after Sawyer's conviction and sentencing, the fact
that Sawyer did not receive this constitutional protection means
that his trial was unfair. Moreover, in this case the unfair result
put the accuracy of the sentencing determination in doubt."1
The "fundamental fairness" exception would resolve both
problems.
The unconstitutional convictions and sentences in Butler,
Parks and Sawyer demonstrate that the real inquiry should
have been whether or not the conviction and sentence were at-
tained in accordance with fundamental constitutional protec-
tions. Providing a defendant with only the constitutional protec-
tions recognized at the time of her conviction, and not with new
rules that are integrally related to these protections, ignores the
purposes inherent in the protections. Because constitutional
criminal procedure rules are themselves fundamental, a defend-
ant should benefit from related new rules even when they are
declared after her conviction becomes final on direct review.1 2 It
is true that federal courts should not retroactively apply all new
constitutional rules to a state habeas petitioner-sometimes the
state's interest in finality must prevail. But there are some new
rules that, although they may not affect the likelihood of an ac-
curate conviction, do implicate the fundamental fairness of a
trial, and 'these rules ought to be retroactively applied. Although
189 See notes 121-31 and accompanying text supra.
190 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1988).
'"' Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that it was doubtful in Sawyer that the
verdict was accurate, as the misleading statement most likely undermined the accuracy
of the capital proceeding. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. CL 2822, 2841 (1990).
192 Schwartz, supra note 175, at 747-49 (discussing the inadequacies of depending on
a retroactivity approach that ignores the importance of constitutional rights).
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this approach does not specifically provide for the capital peti-
tioner, it has been shaped with the hope that no state petitioner,
whether guilty or innocent, will be executed because of an ab-
sence of the constitutional protections necessary for a funda-
mentally fair trial. 1 3
CONCLUSION
The traditional habeas corpus debate has intensified with
the Court's recent retroactivity decisions. The Court's use of
"nonretroactivity" as a defense to granting federal habeas review
to state capital petitioners has resulted in the writ becoming an
"exceptional remedy." 194 The method of analysis that the Court
employed to reach this result has taken the notion of federalism
to its illogical extreme.
Although Congress has not substantively amended the
habeas statute for state prisoners in well over one hundred
years, the recent decisions of the Court should convince Con-
gress to counteract the harsh effects of these decisions by taking
some form of action. The legislative history of the 1867 Act may
reveal little as to legislative intent, but there is no doubt that
Congress empowered the federal courts to free unconstitution-
ally restrained state petitioners. The Court has established a ret-
roactivity doctrine that interferes with this congressional man-
date-the federal courts have been stripped of their power.
Congress must enforce the 1867 Act, which in this case means
attacking the procedural barrier of nonretroactivity. In Justice
Harlan's words, "[R]etroactivity must be rethought" 95 : but this
time with a view towards the rights of the individual-especially
the individual on death row.
Lori Bienstock
113 See Foley, supra note 22, at 211-12 (the denial of habeas corpus review for capi-
tal petitioners involves "a great risk that the undeserving and the innocent will be
executed").
9' See Yale L. Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ
to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 598 (1985) ("[T]he Court has gone
far beyond the traditional common law interpretive process and is engaging in a result.
oriented jurisprudence designed to make habeas hearings on the merits almost as rare as
sightings of Halley's comet.").
" Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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